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Utah Const, art. i, £ 3i 
Rules 
Utah R . . i <^  
ST\TFMENTOFJlTR: ^ - V 
Tins ( \)in I li;i>. |ii- •-•• • *• over the district court 5 orders pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(j) because the\ are orders over which the Court of \ppcals KUK* \UK 
have original appellate jurisdiction i:;. » r u - ^ . .» wai *r 
; • • -i - hMR ~ -(jo. Record on Appeal ("Rec") at 1278. 
STA I'EMFNT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Courts , •: • = 1.: .1 i . 1. «. . * ; * vognized a tort for spoliation of 
r\ i . ln . i- have required that, as one of the key elements of the tort, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that liability in the underlying cause of action w as u\ MI *i *• e 
to ti.e ailegeu; ^ v i : i*.-, .; ; - .-IM hahilr- in the underlying suit is not in 
qiicstion because Skyline, the electrical company that installed the equipment, has 
admitted liability and the only issue remaining in u-. • i:. niiL . • •• * ^ 
Does the loil ul spolialioii nl c\ idm<v r\ en if recognized by this Court, not aopK i :he 
circumstances of this case because any alleged spoliatioi 1 did not prevent plaintills 1mm 
establishing liability in the underlying case? 
2. 1 hi'., ' (111! Ill J most olher states, has never recognized a tort for spoliation 
of evidence. A spoliation tort would burden Utah courts with ongoing litigation, conflict 
with the doctrines of res judicata and ^v-L.uciai , - r •
 !t( •,. s oic^ent 
•. . > - 'i.wius that the tort seeks to pre\ ent. Should this i ourt reject 
plaintiffs' invitation to create a new tort of spoliation of evidence? 
3. I JPS, in investigating tne ace**. - 1 -: •• * was 
a m^ puiM.» ' • -'^il '•< ib an employer as required by the Utah OSH Act. 
1 
Does the dual capacity doctrine, even if adopted by Utah, not apply to this case because 
UPS' obligations regarding the accident scene were related to its role as employer? 
4. Workers' compensation exclusivity reflects a bargain between employer 
and employee regarding compensation for workplace related accidents. The dual 
capacity doctrine, which Utah has not recognized, states that an employer acting in an 
unrelated capacity cannot claim workers' compensation exclusivity and the doctrine 
therefore conflicts with the bargain made for workers' compensation. Should this Court 
refuse to recognize the dual capacity doctrine? 
5. Utah's Workers' Compensation Act does not apply to acts with a conscious 
and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury. Plaintiffs' complaint 
does not allege that defendant UPS had a conscious and deliberate intent to inflict injury 
on the decedent. Does the Utah Workers' Compensation Act exclude a plaintiff from 
bringing a claim for intentional spoliation of evidence against his employer under these 
circumstances even if such a tort is recognized by the Court? 
6. Punitive damages cannot stand alone, but must be attached to a cause of 
action. If this Court does not recognize a spoliation tort, should it dismiss plaintiffs' 
stand alone claim for punitive damages? 
7. Allowing punitive damages without fair notice to the party runs afoul of 
federal and Utah constitutional guarantees of due process. The tort of spoliation has 
never been recognized in the State of Utah. If Utah recognizes a spoliation tort, should 
punitive damages not be allowed in this case because defendants did not have notice of 
the potential for punitive damages at the time the alleged spoliation occurred? 
2 
STANDAltil OI< I t R if "> 
1 *• - i*rt"i\ irMit : pimiitiffs complaint must be determined by the facts pleaded 
rather than the conclusions stated. See Franco v. The Church <>/,A WM * '/*/ :<- -/,-
day Saints. . i - * ^ . . - *•< * i, -, d, j . u m plaintiffs' 
u 1111111 i 1111 ( , i s i 111" , 1111 • iders ail reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in 
a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Set id. at 200. 1 he uiMrict court'N eouu-. -'-OILS uf 
law are reviewed under a . - r . v j m s i-- • ^ H. r f\ *; Cu. v. Si. Benedict's 
Hasp. Ill I r M I'M. I 9^ (Utah 1991 j . Also, "an appellate court mav a ffirm the 
judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground ,-\ UKV>I_* .jpp.> 
record m/,.* . •> navies. - - . « ' .* -, p;u: lipoma v. McPhie, 
" '
 J
 ' ^ ' ^ - < tah 2001) (emphasis omitted)). 
^TERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, 
STATUTORY, AND RFCULATORY PROVT^n > ^ 
Workers' Compensation Act, Lull Code Ann. c M \ - J iuS( l j states, in relevant 
part: 
I ne ngiu to ieco\n LWIUJKHVUM- i*tn -UJ:- .. • uis chapter for miuries 
sustained by an employee, \\heilk. \ chatting in death or not, i> the 
L \clusive remedy against the employer and is the exclusive remedy against 
any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
•'••• • er imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil 
; whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the 
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next ol kin. heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on 
account of any accident or injury or death, in an\ way contracted, sustained, 
, a\ ated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or 
arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at law may not be 
maintained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee 
of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or death of an employee. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are the parents of a former UPS employee—Mark Hills—who died in an 
electrical accident while performing his work at a UPS site on August 19, 2003. Rec. 1-
27. In a separate lawsuit, plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of an electrical contractor, 
Skyline Electric Company ("Skyline"), led to this tragic accident. See Hills v. Skyline 
Electric Co,, Civil Action No. 040107128 (Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, West Jordan Division) (October 14, 2004) ("Hills F). Rec. 631-37. After 
a period of discovery, Skyline amended its answer to the Hills I complaint to admit 
liability for the accident. Rec. 1084-88. 
Plaintiffs filed this current lawsuit ("Hills IF) against UPS, Liberty Mutual (UPS' 
workers' compensation insurance carrier), and Skyline on August 16, 2005, alleging 
tortious interference, intentional misconduct, and negligence. Rec. 1-27. Skyline also 
filed a cross claim against UPS and Liberty Mutual for spoliation. Rec. 159-93. The 
gravamen of each of these claims is the allegation that defendants lost a wall anchor piece 
relevant to the cause of the electrical accident (Compl. Tftj 34-36 (Rec. 7-8); PL Br. 9) in 
the course of their accident investigation. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the Hills II complaint and the district court held a 
hearing on those motions on March 31, 2008. Rec. 719-24 (motions), 1282 (hearing). 
On June 12, 2008, the district court granted those motions in part, dismissing Skyline's 
cross claim with prejudice, dismissing plaintiffs' claim for negligence with prejudice, and 
dismissing parts of the intentional misconduct and tortious interference claims with 
prejudice. Rec. 1177-79. 
4 
The district court, also ordered supplemental briefing on "whether, given Plaintiffs' 
Hills IIComplaint and :>k> im*. i JLLi:. * ;: >laintiffs 
\ i mil I hr ctifitltil t<i .v.u.'i :ider their remaining damage claims under tornou* 
interference and intentional misconduct Rec. 790-9? !* ^ supplemental bnc! 
filed, another hearing wa^ iu ki c u scpt^ September 9 the 
i' * * ^ !t\ ision that dismissed all ot plaintiffs" remaining claims because 
Skyline's admission of liability had mooted any spoliation claim, plain? i«-* u t 
the elements of abu:>e oi precox a;<u i - \* - - •. j * vorkers'compensation 
• * 1-40. 
f Mamtil'N appealed the decision of the district court on Septemt\ i: . - . : ^ :. 
1248-st). • M. aoher . ^ • •* • --peal on its docket. Rec. 
STATEMENT o 
Milk I nil , is fi f ot 11 M i employee of UPS. While at work earl} m the morning on 
August 19, 2003 at a UPS Mobile Distribution Unit, 1lills was electrocutea \\. :, 
attempting to retrieve a package tl MI I k:.,. • • - • •. • , u ,*. 14,12 
(Ret '" i I ills «i |HI inr to the accident, Skyline had reinstalled a iiehi fixture in UK 
unit where Hills worked, L; r °S (Rec. ^) In the hours immediateh • illow nit1 tin 
accident, in the interest o: . s.- .: ^ . UJ skyline conducted 
p - •. • ^  • ^ < oi Miioiib into the cause of the accident /</. <f 4244 (Rec. 0-10) The 
next da}, UPi and 1 iberu Mutual authorized Heath 1 lectin.al I ngmeenng 
post-accident investigation mi. > m. .^- ^i ^ ' « * * - • • •! A . I U - « I ; . 
5 
The Utah Occupational and Safety Health Division of the Labor Commission 
("UOSH") conducted an investigation of the accident and, on January 17, 2004, issued a 
citation to UPS for violating Utah Administrative Code R614-1-5.C.2, which states: 
"Tools, equipment, materials or other evidence that might pertain to the cause of such 
accident shall not be removed or destroyed until so authorized by the Labor Commission 
or one of its Compliance Officers." UPS contested the citation, which resulted in a 
settlement agreement with UOSH on November 30, 2004. That settlement agreement 
reduced the fine from $71,700 to $6,000, and reclassified the citation from "Willful" to 
"Serious." UOSH recognized that, while "the plastic wall anchor pertaining to the cause 
of the accident was removed or destroyed while under the control of UPS," the situation 
was mitigated by the fact that "UPS provided UOSH with contemporaneous photographs 
of the plastic wall anchor at issue, taken during their investigation of the accident shortly 
after the accident occurred." Rec. 57-58, 62-63, 1235. 
On October 15, 2004, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Skyline, asserting a 
wrongful death claim based upon the improper installation of electrical equipment by 
Skyline ("Hills 7") Rec. 631-37. The parties engaged in discovery, including third-party 
discovery from UPS. 
Plaintiffs filed the current complaint against UPS, Skyline, and Liberty Mutual on 
August 16, 2005 ("Hills IF). Rec. 1-27. The Hills //Complaint alleges that the 
defendants "allowed their own employees, and representatives of the other defendants to 
remove and/or alter equipment, materials and/or other evidence pertaining to the cause of 
the electrocution of Mark D. Hills." Id. fflf 42-44; see also id. ffi[ 34-41, 45-46 (Rec. 7-
6 
11). Based on these alleged facts, the Complaint brought three causes of action: 
negligence, intentional miscondiK-:. . '^^- i !- ; ' n ihnv causes of actior 
aiic^ u •- d. LMMI.IM- * ! i\ proximately caus[ed] the cover-up and spoliation 
of evidence and tortiously interfered with the Plaintiffs" right to l.,mg uausis v 
resulting from the wrongful vkai - *% 'Xi ' l p * ^cx . 1:>, i /, lUj. 
\ \pK nii 'd i moi ion to d ismiss the / / / / / s / / c o m p l a i n t on N o v e m b e r 7. 20*05, and 
Liberty Mutua l filed a mot ion to d ismiss o n N o v e m b e i i-». J u u x iu_\. .v-.v^. - L 
O n J a n u a n IJ uuo . : ^ _ . I . . , :iled a uo.ss " hum a,n r n - • *>Vt t--i spoliat ion of ev idence . 
• • ~ * •« * moved to dismiss Skyline's cross cknm on February 6, 2006, Rec. 
-^02- i S UPS argued that a (oil of spoliation was not recognized unuei 
Llanii ol spoliation VULN ; • • •< ,.-• yei demonstrated an inability 
•
 !
 v ase in Hills 1 due to the lack of spoliated evidence, and that the exclusive 
remedy of Ulah\s Workers' Compensation Act barred piainuj i u;«-
. * K * ».. . oi p . \ al Hansen) held a hearing 
regarding the pending motions to dismiss and ordered supplemental briefing. Rec. 459, 
1280 supplt mental briefs were filed in December J* ! t- *«••*- * er 
i >. . J ^ -^ i .». - -hdate the Hills I and /////s //cases forpurposes 
of discovery. Fhat motion was granted by the Hills /court. Rec. 646-49. 
Judge Hansen held a telephonic status conieiu • «i: .» - u 
he explainer; <a: .:• .»i>< " oiu-u loi his recusal based upon his past 
representation of both UPS and Liberty Mutual and having served as co-counsel with 
plaintiffs' counsel Edward Moriarity. Kee ; i "f 
7 
(Rec. 501-63), and Judge Hansen recused himself on February 21, 2007. Rec. 587-89. 
The Hills II case was reassigned to Judge Terry Christiansen. Id. 
On May 4, 2007, Judge Christiansen stayed a decision on the pending motions to 
dismiss pending resolution of Hills /because "[i]t is necessary for Hills I to be resolved 
to determine whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case in Hills I due to 'Spoliated 
Evidence."' Rec. 595-98. 
On October 11, 2007, after further discovery, Skyline filed a motion to amend its 
answer in Hills I to admit liability. Rec. 712-18. As a result of Skyline's motion to file 
an amended answer, UPS filed a motion for protective order on October 18, 2007, 
seeking to cancel remaining discovery directed at liability issues, which was no longer 
relevant in light of Skyline's admission of liability. Liberty Mutual also filed a motion 
for a protective order on the same grounds. Plaintiffs did not oppose either motion for 
protective order. Rec. 613-718. 
On December 6, 2007, Judge Roth entered an order permitting Skyline to amend 
its answer in Hills I to admit liability. Rec. 621-22. Judge Roth also granted the motions 
for protective order precluding plaintiffs from taking depositions and discovery on 
liability issues, agreeing that the only remaining issues in Hills I related to damages. Rec. 
626-29. ("[Bjecause Skyline Electric Co. has decided to admit liability in Hills /, 
effectively mooting the Hills II litigation . . . all future discovery shall be limited to 
damages issue in Hills I only."). 
UPS, joined by the other defendants, filed a motion to dismiss in Hills II in 
January 2008. Rec. 613-724. Judge Christiansen held a hearing on the motion to dismiss 
8 
on March 31, 2008. Rec. 790-91, 1282. At that hearing, Judge Christiansen dismissed 
Skyline's cross claim, plaintiffs' negligence claim, and most of plaintiffs' intentional 
misconduct and tortious interference claims. The district court determined that Skyline's 
admission of liability in Hills /had mooted those claims because plaintiffs could seek 
those remedies against Skyline in the damages phase of Hills L Hr'g Tr. 55-56, Mar. 31, 
2008 (Rec. 1282). 
The district court ordered supplemental briefing on whether to dismiss the 
remaining damages claims for intentional misconduct and tortious interference. Id. The 
parties briefed these issues and the district court held another oral argument on 
September 3, 2008. Rec. 793-1088, 1090-1123, 1142-71, 1181-95, 1281. In a decision 
and memorandum issued on September 9, 2008, the district court granted defendants' 
motion to dismiss with regard to the remainder of plaintiffs' claims. Rec. 1224-40. 
Although the plaintiffs' complaint only alleged "intentional misconduct" and "tortious 
interference," the district court determined that plaintiffs "appear to be claiming an 
independent tort of intentional spoliation of evidence" and that neither "the intentional 
nor the negligent spoliation of evidence as an independent tort has been adopted in Utah." 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7, 8 (Rec. 1230-31). 
The district court refused to recognize a tort of spoliation of evidence and 
characterized plaintiffs' attempts to justify that tort based on Utah precedent—including 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), and Burns v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)-as "a big leap" and "a great 
leap," respectively. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6, 8 (Rec. 1229, 1231). The district court also 
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explained that California—the first jurisdiction to recognize a spoliation tort—had 
subsequently rejected that tort for both first-party and third-party spoliation. Id. at 7 
(Rec. 1230) (citing Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); 
Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999)). 
The district court rejected plaintiffs' argument that, without a tort for spoliation of 
evidence, there would be no remedy against the defendants and the alleged spoliation 
would not be deterred in the future. Quite to the contrary, the district court explained, 
there were a wide range of administrative and criminal penalties in place "to prevent 
tampering with evidence." Dist. Ct. Op. at 12 (Rec. 1235). The Utah OSH Act provides 
for sanctions of up to $70,000 per violation of the Act and creates a misdemeanor offense 
for willful violations. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-6-307(d). Utah also has general 
criminal penalties for destroying evidence, and those criminal penalties are directed at 
both employees and employers. Dist. Ct. Op. at 12-13 (Rec. 1235-36). The risk of these 
fines and penalties, the district court reasoned, would be a sufficient deterrent and no 
additional tort would be necessary. Id. 
Even if Utah recognized a tort of spoliation of evidence, the district court 
concluded, plaintiffs had not stated a claim for that tort because "[gjeneral tort law 
requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff damages" and 
plaintiffs had failed to do so. Id. at 9 (Rec. 1232). "Even viewing the facts in a light 
most favorable to Plaintiffs, Skyline's recent admission of liability in Hills I clearly 
establishes that Plaintiffs are successful" in proving liability in Hills I. Id. at 10 (Rec. 
1233). Because the spoliation claim goes to proving liability in Hills /, "Plaintiffs cannot 
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show damages caused by UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts." Id. Damages for the 
wrongful death claim "were fixed at the moment of Mr. Hill's death," and defendants' 
alleged actions after his death could not affect the damages portion of the Hills I case. Id. 
at 10-11 (Rec. 1233-34). 
The district court also noted that plaintiffs, at the March 31 hearing, had "made 
arguments based upon facts and a new theory that were not in the Complaint and Demand 
for jury trial" that defendants' actions during discovery in Hills /"resulted in a chain of 
unnecessary legal proceedings by increasing the costs of suit." Id. at 5, n.2 (Rec. 1228-
29 n.2). The district court did not make a ruling on these arguments because they were 
not properly raised, but noted that it was "not persuaded that Defendants did anything 
more than defend their respective interests and participate in the legal process." Id. "If 
Defendants had hindered or delayed for an improper purpose," the district court noted, it 
would have expected "to see motions to compel and motions for sanctions in Hills /[, but] 
no such motions have been filed." Id. 
As an alternative ground for its decision, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' 
claims for falling within the exclusivity provision of Utah's Workers' Compensation Act. 
Id. at 14-15 (Rec. 1237-38). Plaintiffs had argued that the dual capacity doctrine—in 
which an employer acts outside its capacity as employer—precluded application of 
workers' compensation. The district court noted that Utah had not recognized the dual 
capacity doctrine and, even if that doctrine existed under Utah law, "UPS' conduct in its 
role with OSHA and the co-defendants did not generate obligations that are unrelated to 
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UPS' obligations flowing from its first role as an employer." Id. at 15 (Rec. 1238). The 
district court therefore dismissed the remaining claims and plaintiffs appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To prevail in this appeal, plaintiffs must first convince this Court to adopt two new 
theories never before recognized in the State of Utah: a new tort cause of action for 
spoliation of evidence and a new exception to workers' compensation exclusivity known 
as the dual capacity doctrine. The Court need not reach either of these novel questions, 
however, because plaintiffs' complaint fails to satisfy the requisite elements of either 
theory. 
This Court need not decide whether to recognize a new tort for spoliation, as 
liability in the underlying cause of action here {Hills I) has been admitted so plaintiffs, by 
their own admission, cannot prove a key element of the tort. 
This Court, like most other states, should also not adopt the tort of spoliation 
because other remedies sufficiently reduce the risk of spoliation and because the new tort 
would create considerable uncertainty regarding the finality of judgment and would 
increase the risk of erroneous judgments. 
Alternatively, and also dispositive of plaintiffs' claims, the workers' compensation 
scheme provides the exclusive remedy in this case. To defeat this well-established 
exclusivity rule, plaintiffs would have this Court adopt another new doctrine—the dual 
capacity doctrine—that this Court to date has refused to do. Even if this Court were 
inclined to make that leap, the dual capacity doctrine would not apply in this case in any 
event, as UPS was acting in its role as employer—and not in some other dual, unrelated 
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capacity—during the course of the accident and the post-accident investigation. Plaintiffs 
have also not pled the required intent to remove their claims from workers' compensation 
exclusivity. 
Finally, plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages cannot stand without an underlying 
cause of action. In any event, allowing punitive damages against UPS under a spoliation 
theory infringes on UPS's federal and state due process rights, because at the time the 
alleged conduct occurred, Utah did not recognize a tort for spoliation of evidence. 
Allowing plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages to proceed, therefore, would be contrary 
to due process. 
ARGUMENT 
h PLAINTIFFS' SPOLIATION CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
A. Skyline's Admission Of Liability In Hills I Means Plaintiffs Cannot 
Establish Spoliation. 
The district court held that plaintiffs could not establish a spoliation claim, even if 
one were recognized in Utah. Dist Ct. Op. at 10 (Rec. 1233). The district court first 
determined, under general tort law, that a spoliation tort would require a plaintiff to show, 
among other things, that the plaintiff "was unsuccessful [in pursuing a civil action] 
because of the absence of the destroyed evidence." Id. at 9 (Rec. 1232) (quoting Mx v. 
Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 2001)). Under plaintiffs' theory of the case, the 
alleged spoliation of evidence relating to the cause of the electrical accident prevented 
them from proving their case against Skyline. Compl. ffi[ 53-55 (Rec. 12-13). But 
because Skyline had already admitted liability in Hills /, the district court concluded, 
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"liability is no longer an issue in Hills I [and] Plaintiffs' legal remedy is not affected by 
UPS and Liberty Mutual's actions." DisL Ct. Op. at 10 (Rec. 1233). 
Plaintiffs do not directly rebut the district court's conclusion or explain how, in 
light of the admission by Skyline in Hills I, they can nonetheless continue to pursue a 
spoliation tort. Indeed, in summarizing the case law of other jurisdictions that have 
adopted the tort of spoliation, plaintiffs admit that "[t]he two most consistent variables 
[for a spoliation tort] are the nature of the duty to preserve evidence and the requirement 
of inability to prove the underlying suitr PL Br. 17 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs accurately summarize what other courts have held to be an essential 
element of a spoliation claim: that plaintiff was unable to prove his case due to the 
spoliated evidence. See e.g., Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I DuPont De Neomurs & Co., 341 
F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that to prove spoliation claim, plaintiffs "must 
demonstrate that [they] were unable to prove [their] underlying action owing to the 
unavailability of the evidence") (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in 
original); Kolanovic v. Gida, 11 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating that di prima 
facie case for spoliation "cannot be established unless and until the plaintiff has failed to 
prove his case without the missing evidence," and recognizing that "[i]f the plaintiff 
prevails on his underlying cause of action, there are no damages resulting from the 
destruction of the evidence"). Those jurisdictions that recognize spoliation require a 
plaintiff to establish a "significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit; [ ] a 
causal relationship between the evidence destruction and the inability to prove the 
lawsuit, and [ ] damages." Talmadge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 96-8044, 
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1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3114, *12 (10th Cir. Feb. 21, 1997) (emphasis added); see also 
Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Ctr., 877 So.2d 843, 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2004) (same under Florida law); Lykins v. Miami Valley Hosp., 811 N.E.2d 124, 147 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (same under Ohio law); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 572 
(W. Va. 2003) (same under West Virginia law). Damages from spoliation do not arise, 
and a cause of action based on spoliation of evidence cannot exist, unless plaintiffs 
demonstrate that they were unable to prove the Hills I case because of the allegedly 
spoliated evidence. 
Skyline's admission of liability in Hills I completely obviates the need for 
plaintiffs to prove liability—it has been admitted—and therefore no spoliation tort can lie 
against UPS in Hills II. Plaintiffs' Hills I complaint alleges that Skyline, due to 
negligence in conducting electrical work at Hills' worksite several days prior to the 
accident, caused Hills' death. To prove that case, plaintiffs would have needed to 
demonstrate how Skyline performed its work, how that work was below the applicable 
standard of care, and how it caused the death of Mr. Hills. That is how the alleged 
spoliated evidence, in plaintiffs' view, might have affected their ability to prove their 
case. The need to prove that case is now nonexistent, however, as Skyline has admitted 
liability. 
The allegedly spoliated evidence related to the cause of the accident, not to 
damages, and damages are the only remaining issue to be litigated in Hills I. The district 
court therefore properly rejected plaintiffs' analogy to probable expectancy of damages: 
"Defendants could not alter Plaintiffs probable expectancy in damages [because] 
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[e]vidence of damages were frozen at the time of Mr. Hill's death." Dist. Ct. Op. at 11 
(Rec. 1234). Plaintiffs have come forward with no refutation for the proposition that 
damages in a wrongful death action "were fixed at the moment of. . . death." Id. at 10 
(Rec. 1233); see, e.g., Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1982) ("It is the loss of 
society, love, companionship, protection and affection which usually constitute the heart 
of the [wrongful death] action."). 
Plaintiffs alternatively seem to claim that they should be entitled to damages based 
upon delay in litigation. Plaintiffs dress up this claim in various forms, calling it 
"hindrance with a legal cause of action," PL Br. 8, "a protracted obfuscation" and 
"obstruction" of plaintiffs' efforts to obtain evidence in Hills /, without citing the 
complaint. Id. 11. Plaintiffs also state, without citation to the complaint, that UPS 
"delayed and ultimately denied taking of depositions; and impeded access to reports 
relative to the fatal electrocution," id. 25, and that "since Liberty Mutual and UPS have 
effectively thwarted any discovery in this action, specifics of what was altered and 
destroyed have not been fully clarified." Id. 33 n.14 (emphasis added). 
The district court dismissed this claim, calling it "a new theory" that was not "in 
the Complaint and demand for jury trial" that was "improperly raised in response to a 
motion to dismiss." Dist. Ct. Op. at 5-6 n.2 (Rec. 1228-29 n.2). In any event, those 
claims are baseless. After reviewing the course of consolidated discovery in the cases, 
the district court said it was "not persuaded that Defendants did anything more than 
defend their respective interests and participate in the legal process." Id. "If Defendants 
had hindered or delayed for an improper purpose, this Court would expect to see motions 
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to compel and motions for sanctions in Hills L However, no such motions have been 
filed in Hills /." Id.1 The district court also noted that plaintiffs "fail to present any case 
or statutory law that 'mere delay without other injury is actionable' for intentional 
spoliation of evidence." Id. at 11 (Rec. 1234). 
Plaintiffs offer no response to the district court's conclusion that their allegation of 
delay in litigation or abuse of process had not been pled in the complaint. Holmes Dev., 
LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 904 (Utah 2002) ("A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by 
raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion 
to dismiss or for summary judgment... ."). Moreover, plaintiffs cannot make out a 
claim for abuse of process because "[i]f a legal process is used for its proper and intended 
purpose, the mere fact that it has some other collateral effect does not constitute abuse of 
process." Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 29 (Utah 2003) 
1
 At the September 3, 2008 hearing before the district court, plaintiffs' counsel 
incredibly argued that, while plaintiffs did not file discovery motions because "one of 
the things about practicing law out in this area is we do not run to the courts for every 
single bit of relief if somebody denies something done," Hr'g Tr. 35, Sept. 3, 2008, 
(Rec. 1281), they should instead be permitted to pursue an entirely separate lawsuit to 
seek redress for alleged delays in discovery. The district court succinctly rejected this 
notion: THE COURT: "I fully adhere to the rules of civility and those sorts of things, 
and I agree with what you're saying; but on the other hand, it seems to me that before 
you get to a cause of action, you need to use the rules to get the case moving if there 
is a delay. Do you follow me? MR. MORIARITY: Oh, I fully follow you. THE 
COURT: So again, I just think you're going down the wrong track. If you're going 
to argue that they filed motions, and because of those motions this case is delayed, 
and therefore you're entitled to damages; I just don't see that, Mr. Moriarity. MR. 
MORIARITY: I was not being clear to you, Your Honor. And I understand [that 
that's what you're saying]. What I was doing was responding to them saying that I 
didn't file protective orders and so I must have agreed with [this]." Id. at 41-42 (Rec. 
1281). 
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(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs cite one line from a footnote of an Indiana 
opinion for the proposition that "[spoliation damages can likewise be asserted via the 
costs incurred by having to adjust one's case to the impact of the spoliator's actions." PL 
Br. 26 (citing Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134, 140 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). 
That case has been rejected by the Indiana Supreme Court, supra at 21 n.3, and is not a 
correct statement of the law regarding abuse of process because any delay due to a party 
utilizing the legal process cannot be a basis for damages. Bennett, 70 P.3d at 29. 
In addition, as the district court noted, the claim that UPS somehow delayed 
discovery for some improper purpose is patently untrue as demonstrated by the record of 
consolidated discovery in the two cases. For example, contrary to plaintiffs' claim that 
UPS had thwarted "any" discovery in Hills /, two UPS depositions were taken in April 
2005 and, in May and June 2005, UPS produced photos and video footage taken by UPS 
during the post-accident inspections. Rec. 989-91, 994-99. In addition, plaintiffs' 
counsel twice thanked UPS's counsel for his efforts to have depositions completed and 
agreed that delays were not the fault of UPS. See, e.g., Rec. 1005-06 (June 14, 2005 
email from plaintiffs' counsel to UPS counsel thanking him for his "thought and hard 
work . . . put into getting the depositions rescheduled"); id. 1016-19 (July 28, 2005 email 
from plaintiffs' counsel stating to UPS counsel, "I appreciate the efforts you have set 
forth in trying to get the depositions set and I know it is not your fault they have not been 
taken."). UPS also made efforts to have tangible evidence examined by the Hills I parties 
but the Hills I parties could not agree on a protocol for doing so. Id. 848. Finally, when 
Skyline admitted liability and UPS and Liberty Mutual moved for protective orders to 
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halt any further discovery of their employees because any information they had was not 
relevant to damages, plaintiffs did not respond and the district court in Hills I granted the 
motions. Id. 851-66. Filing motions that were granted by the court and cooperating in 
good faith in discovery simply cannot be grounds for a separate cause of action. 
Thus, plaintiffs' complaint simply fails to allege any viable theory of recovery. 
B. Utah Should Not Recognize A Spoliation Tort. 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' complaint simply fails to allege the 
necessary elements of a spoliation theory of recovery and the Court therefore need not 
reach the novel question of whether Utah would recognize such a tort. Summit Water 
Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 123 P.3d 437, 452 (Utah 2005) ("Our settled policy is 
to avoid giving advisory opinions in regard to issues unnecessary to the resolution of the 
claims before us."). Should the Court nonetheless be inclined to examine the question, it 
should reject this novel tort in Utah. 
As the district court explained, plaintiffs attempt to plead a claim for spoliation of 
evidence, a "doctrine [that] has been discussed and sparingly applied in various forms 
throughout the United States." Dist. Ct. Op. at 9 (Rec. 1232) (emphasis added). The first 
jurisdiction to adopt the tort, California, has now explicitly rejected the tort for both first-
party and third-party spoliation claims. Id. at 7 (Rec. 1230). The district court also 
concluded that "[t]he law specifically provides sanctions where [spoliation] occur[s]" in 
the form of administrative and criminal penalties. Id. at 12-13 (Rec. 1235-36). Indeed, 
the district court noted: 
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There was a punishment for UPS' actions, a fine was imposed by Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health ("UOSH"), which is the state entity that 
investigates accidents at work sites. UOSH has investigated both the death 
and subsequent actions of UPS. As a result of their investigation, UOSH 
imposed a fine against UPS, the amount of which is beyond this Court's 
purview. 
Id. at 12 (Rec. 1235). 
As plaintiffs fully admit, Utah has not adopted the tort of spoliation of evidence. 
See CookAssocs. Inc. v. PCS Sales (USA), Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1357 (D. Utah 
2003); Burns v. Cannodale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Most 
of the jurisdictions to consider adopting a spoliation tort have refused to do so.2 
Although plaintiffs devote significant attention to the different contours of the 
spoliation tort in the jurisdictions that have adopted it, PL Br. 14-23, they fail to offer this 
Court any reason why the tort should be adopted by this State. To the contrary, 
recognizing such a tort is not needed because current sanctions protect against spoliation, 
2
 See, e.g., La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1986); Cedars-Sinai Med. 
Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior 
Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999); Lucas v. Christiana Skating Ctr., Ltd., 722 A.2d 
1247 (Del. 1998); Gardner v. Blackston, 365 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. 1998); Gribben v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (lnd. 2005); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 
734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987); Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1997); 
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d434, 
437 (Minn. 1990); Richardson v. Sara Lee Corp., 847 So.2d 821 (Miss. 2003); 
Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002); Timber Tech 
Engineered Bldg. Prods, v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952 (Nev. 2002); Elias v. 
Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Trevino v. Ortega, 969 
S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998). 
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it would place unnecessary burdens on the judicial system, and it would risk jury 
confusion and inconsistency.3 
First and foremost, a tort of spoliation is unnecessary because there are a variety of 
other remedies both within and outside the litigation process to significantly reduce the 
risk of parties spoliating evidence. For example, a party who has lost or destroyed 
evidence is subject to evidentiary sanctions, including unfavorable inferences, striking of 
other testimony, and even the entry of a judgment against the party. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 37(b); Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957, 965-66 (Utah 2008); 
3
 Plaintiffs identify 11 jurisdictions that have some form of a spoliation tort. PL Br. at 
16. Defendants are not aware of any other jurisdictions that have recognized a 
spoliation tort. Some of those 11 jurisdictions have a more limited application of 
spoliation than plaintiffs have implied. Indiana, for example, has refused to recognize 
a first-party tort of spoliation, Gribben, 824 N.E.2d at 355. The Indiana Supreme 
Court also rejected the case cited by plaintiffs in rejecting a third-party spoliation 
claim by an employee against an employer, on the grounds of the problems inherent 
in recognizing such a tort and on workers' compensation exclusivity. Glotzbach v. 
Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 339-42 (Ind. 2006) (rejecting Thompson v. Owensby, 704 
N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (cited in PL Br. 16)). The Supreme Court of Florida 
has similarly rejected a first-party spoliation tort, Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
908 So.2d 342 (Fla. 2005), and has not addressed courts of appeals cases recognizing 
a third-party tort for spoliation. See, e.g., Townsend v. Conshor, Inc., 832 So.2d 166, 
167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (cited in PL Br. at 16). Although Louisiana has 
recognized a third-party spoliation claim, some courts have refused to recognize a 
negligence spoliation claim, instead requiring a showing that the spoliation was 
intentional. See, e.g., Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So.2d 524, 
534 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc., 869 So.2d 922 (La. Ct. App. 
2004). New Mexico has also refused to recognize a negligent spoliation claim, 
allowing only an intentional spoliation claim. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 
P.2d 185, 189-90 (N.M. 1995), overruled on other grounds, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge 
Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 1148 (N.M. 2001). Kansas has also significantly limited the 
circumstances under which a party may plead spoliation. Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1183 
(rejecting an intentional spoliation tort Cwabsent some independent tort, contract, 
agreement, voluntary assumption of duty, or special relationship of the parties''). 
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Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 517-18. Evidentiary inferences may also apply in the 
underlying lawsuit if a third-party spoliator acted at the behest of a party. See Temple 
Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 230; see also Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Ind. 
2006) ("Courts also have the power to issue contempt sanctions against non-parties who 
frustrate the discovery process by suppressing or destroying evidence."). And, as the 
district court noted, there can be criminal penalties for spoliation. Dist. Ct. Op. at 12-13 
(Rec. 1235-36). "Regulatory, criminal, and disciplinary sanctions, as well as legislative 
measures and sanctions available to litigants within the scope of the original lawsuit, 
frequently are of more utility than tort litigation in accomplishing the goals of deterring 
and punishing litigation-related misconduct." Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 228; see 
also Lucas v. Christiana Skating Center, Ltd., 722 A.2d 1247, 1250-51 (Del. 1998); 
Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811,815 (Ky. 1997); Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. 
Prods, v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952, 954 (Nev. 2002). Indeed, in the context of a 
workplace accident with a product liability component, it may be "in the employer's 
interest to preserve evidence that may aid in pursuing [ ] subrogation rights against the 
manufacturer." Glotzbach, 854 N.E.2d at 341. 
With regard to the facts of this case, additional deterrence for spoliation is found 
in the Utah OSH Act, which requires that: "Tools, equipment, materials or other 
evidence that might pertain to the cause of such accident shall not be removed or 
destroyed until so authorized by the Labor Commission or one of its Compliance 
Officers." Utah Admin. Code R614-1-5.C.2. Pursuant to its statutory responsibility, 
UOSH thoroughly investigated, received and reviewed documents, and evaluated the 
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post-accident investigations conducted by UPS. It determined that a citation was 
necessai \ and iv-unl »h »l «" ' I 'IOH JIL" inr<< I M" '|11 O V O ^ I H A ' H fin11 n i i ih 'ahih ' l;n '' Hi.il U1JIS 
had provided contemporaneous photographs and e\ idence of a plastic \\ all aneh* »i that, .it 
some point during the investigation, had been lost. As plaintiffs concede, the i.: iii i » i 1 
^ \,ct explicitly d : i! "s i lot allo\ < ' its pi ovisions to serv e as a basis foi a prv - ate cause of 
action, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-6-110(2;, VI Br. 26 n.9, so the Act was incmi u allow 
only UOSH to evaluate the applicability of that provision I he process workeu .r, u was 
ii ltei tded. 
A spoliation tort would be laigel) duplieam e o! fhe various rules and sanctions 
already in plneH ?n the administrative, civil. JIRI criminal context to deter spot <a 
- • • ; . : < - : • : » . - - . -ptions available under Utah law IO 
discourage spoliation and so an additional tort remedy is not necessary. 
Recognition of a spoliation tort also raises significant problen is foi the pi oper 
fuiiuliuiiiiii* ol 11 it (iiiln i.tl svsdiii In lor example, undermining res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. Courts generally do not allow a direct or collateral attack on a 
judgment on ti.e lhi>\> that evidence relevani u. me case was falsified, concealed, or 
si lppi essed G ?dars-Sinai9 954 P.2d at 516; Wright v. W.E. Callahan Constr. Co., 156 
P.2d 710, 711 (I Itah 1945) Vllowing a tort of spoliation weakens the effectiveness of 
tinaijudgments and opens the possibility of ei ldless litigation „ as pai ties aggi le < ' ed b> tl le 
o't itcoi tie coi il :i attei npt to look back at their discovery disputes to seek new ways to 
challenge the judgment. "Were the rule otherwise, every case would be subject to 
constant retrials in tl ic guise of independent actions ' Aw/y/m \ I\*M I I) i // /V/ iterators, 
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Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court 
should be "reluctant to provide disappointed litigants a second opportunity to seek the 
compensation they sought in the original lawsuit, even if they seek it against a party not 
involved in the original lawsuit." Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 229. "[Rjecognizing 
a cause of action for evidence spoliation would create an impermissible layering of 
liability and would allow a plaintiff to collaterally attack an unfavorable judgment with a 
different factfinder at a later time, in direct opposition to the sound policy of ensuring the 
finality of judgments." Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. 1998). The 
judicial system's strong interest in concluding litigation and resolving all matters 
regarding litigation within each case should lead this Court to conclude that a spoliation 
tort should not be adopted. 
Plaintiffs' unsupported statements in their brief regarding UPS's conduct during 
the course of the Hills land Hills //litigation provide ample evidence of the dangers of 
recognizing a tort of spoliation. Notwithstanding the finality of the liability 
determination in Hills /, plaintiffs have used further resources in both the district court 
and this Court seeking to obtain damages for claims that have already been admitted. 
One can only expect that, with the availability of a spoliation tort, many cases could 
develop two tracks: the underlying cause of action and the follow-up litigation regarding 
potential discovery abuses that one party alleges occurred in the underlying litigation. 
The proper forum for such disputes in not a second lawsuit, but is instead the initial court, 
where the rules of procedure provide for discovery motions, sanctions motions, and the 
like, to address such issues. 
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A spoliation tort also creates significant risk of erroneous liability. "The 
compensating spoliation victims, would create the risk of erroneous determinations of 
spoliation liability (that is, findings of liability in cases in which availability of the 
spoliated ev idei ice vv en ild i lot ha ' e changed tl ie en ltcoi ne of th s i 11 id zi lii lg litigatior i) " 
Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 519; see also Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 \ I 2d 
349, 355 (Ind. 2005) (agreeing with Cedars-Sinai). Specificah ^ <here are serious doubts 
abc i it den ioi isti atii lg that acti lal 1 lai n i1 \ as si iffered in litigatk to spoliatioi i Cedars-
Sinai, 954 P.2d at 518. "In such cases, even if the j in y inters from the act of spoliation 
that the spoliated evidence was somehow unfavorable to the spoliator, there will typically 
b < : ' - - * " ' • - * • • - • • • . - • ! ' ' • - ' . i t 
would ha\e weighed in the spoliation \ ietim's lavoi " id.: see also Trevino, y<V> S,W.2d 
at 953 (A spoliation tort "does not create damages amenable to monetary 
\ - \ •> • a- . - :" : - '• -.i-.-i .• • mil iu lake a look within a 
case, a tricky proposition at best. Even i\ the spoliation tort was tried along wit; the 
underlying cause of action, the presence of the tort raises serious concerns aboi it jiiry 
coiifi ision and ii iconsistency, as juries and judges would be determining not only what 
had been proven, but speculate what might had been proven had allegedly spoliated 
evidence been presented to them... 
Plaintiffs discuss the need for a third-party spoliation tort, PL Br. at 18, but ignore 
the fad thai "the burdens and costs of recognizing a tort remedy fm th^d party spoliation 
are considerate perhaps even greater than in the case of first pari, ; . • 
' '• • 2 . 5 
Crnty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 231. "To adopt such a tort and place a duty upon an employer 
to preserve all possible physical evidence that might somehow be utilized in a third-party 
action by an injured employee would place an intolerable burden upon every employer." 
Koplin, 734 P.2d at 1182. Adopting a third-party spoliation tort, especially when other 
remedies are available, would impose a burden on employers and other potential holders 
of evidence that is simply not justified.4 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982), does not support establishing a spoliation tort in Utah because the tort allowed by 
Leigh, intentional interference with economic relations based upon the notion of probable 
expectancy, is a concept that applies to traditional commercial relationships and has no 
application to the value of a potential court victory. "[U]sing tort law to correct 
misconduct arising during litigation raises policy considerations not present in deciding 
whether to create tort remedies for harms arising in other contexts/' Cedars-Sinai, 954 
P.2d at 515. For example, courts have not allowed civil actions based upon perjury. 
Cline v. State, 142 P.3d 127 (Utah 2005) ("The Utah Code provides criminal penalties for 
breach of confidentiality of records, child abuse, obstruction of justice, and perjury, but 
does not provide for a private right of action for any of those acts. Accordingly, we 
refuse to create a private right of action under [these statutory provisions] when the 
4
 "The risk of erroneous spoliation liability could also impose indirect costs by causing 
persons or entities to take extraordinary measures to preserve for an indefinite period 
documents and things of no apparent value solely to avoid the possibility of spoliation 
liability if years later those items turn out to have some potential relevance to future 
litigation." Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 519. 
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legislature has not seen fit to do so.") (internal quotations omitted) (altetitdous in 
original); see also c < JW . ». K^ upon the notion of a 
probable expectancy of economic gain, but the expectancy of gain in litigation is a 
different type of interest than expectancy of gain during typical UCHIIIIIII c ml i rial i< mslups. 
See lempu i;;,. . ;<w' '* 'tii^Ir-s< hvie have been cautious in 
definin. tiie interference torts [interference with contract and interference with 
prospective economic advantage] to avoid promoting speculam c dinni'. I Ims ^ < 
refusec; to recopw. t. * > • • * <.• context [and we] also refused to 
-
 1(j t j i e t o r t t 0 protect expectancies beyond those involved in ordinary commercial 
business dealings—a person's expectancy in the outcome of a jzo\ eminent licensing 
proceeding is is ' poi re ied »i;ra111^ t oulsnlr interference. *) (internal quotations omitted) 
(alterations in original). Simply put, "[a] litigant's expectancy in the outcome of 
litigation is peculiarly uncertain, being subject in (lie disueium nl I HUM -UMI |M lit 
Leigh m\ o lus j a traditional i nmmnvial dispute as one party was scaring a\va\ the 
potential business of another party by various commercial tactics, eventually !wicin;j me 
plaintiff into bankruptcy. 657 l\2d at 2^ '-M\J. Although OIK i»l the tin'1 • - ** j nung 
"d' In> nious ",r', ^iiil < thost suits were aimed at destroying the business, not obtaining a 
result from the litigation itself As the district court correctly noted, it w> ik ni^ 
leap" to use Le/g/i as support for est a' ^ ••*'>. uu not bridge 
Other courts that have refused to adopt a spoliation tort have recognized that 
court> have ways to remedy problems raised (n spoh inon <»< <1^ Minn'" and lb it there are 
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administrative and criminal remedies that address the same issues a spoliation tort would 
address. In addition, adopting a spoliation tort would unnecessarily complicate litigation, 
making the underlying cause of action merely the opening prelude in a potentially 
ongoing fight between the parties about how allegedly spoliated evidence affected the 
outcome. The burdens of a spoliation tort, in extending the litigation process, harming 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the doubt as to whether an 
unfavorable verdict was indeed due to spoliated evidence, far outweigh the allegedly 
additional deterrence a spoliation tort would have in light of the administrative, criminal, 
and court-imposed remedies that are already available. Utah should not recognize this 
tort. 
II. THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY BAR APPLIES 
Even if this Court were inclined to recognize a tort for spoliation of evidence, and 
even if plaintiffs had alleged its essential elements (which they have not), the Court 
should nonetheless uphold the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims because of the exclusivity of 
Utah's workers' compensation system. An employee's sole remedy (and that of his 
heirs) against his employer for events in the workplace is the right to compensation under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (2005) 
("The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive remedy against the employer 
. . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all 
other civil liability whatsoever . . . ."). "[According to [the statute's] plain language, it is 
clear that the [Act] provides the sole, or exclusive, mechanism for recovery when injured 
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employees, or their family members or heirs, attempt to recover compensation foi the 
employees' work-relatea :; - " / iUinlordlns. Or. 
u, IOJ J (Utah 2000). 
The district court correctly rejected plaintiffs' claims on the alternative ground (hal 
they were Ixu u ^ . ..; v . \ .1 ^ • \ •• nation Act. 
I iT-ii » i - . ai i 4 -o ^Rc^. i^37-38j. iiic district ,oui" rioted that plaintiffs' theory to 
avoid exclusivity-—the dual capacity doctrine—had not been recognized in I "l.i'li and llul,, 
in any event, the do< IIIIK1 woiild iiol appl-, bivausr "UPS" conduct that is the basis of 
i .uus intentional misconduct' and "tortuous interference' causes of action relate to 
UPS' activities after Mr. Hills death," Id at IS (idv I » % N i I lie disinci i oui i illinium 
stated: 
These activities include: conducting its own investigation of the accident 
site prior to notifying OSHA or law enforcement; contacting and working 
in conceit with the co-defendants; removal, alteration of equipment, 
material, or other evidence; failure to disclose, misrepresent, and/or conceal 
their actions to OSHA, and other like allegations. Even viewing the facts in 
a light most favorable to Plaintiff UPS' conduct in its role with OSHA and 
the co-defendants did not generate obligations that are unrelated to UPS' 
obligations flowing from its first role as an employer. 
/ |l" I hus t*\ HI il thr (lislii'1 mini adoptrd the dual capacity doctrine, it would still 
dismiss. 
Plaintiffs bring two arguments against (IK appln ahilil , nl ,< i w\x\\ cumpcnsalion 
i\» ' ^uurt should adopt another new doctrine—the dual 
capacity doctnne and iuk that the workers' compensation exclusivity rule does not 
apply because IIPS was acting in a role other th^n -..;».-. -• >• 
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accident. Second, plaintiffs contend that the Act does not apply to a tort for intentional 
spoliation of evidence. 
Even if this Court adopted the dual capacity doctrine as suggested by plaintiffs, it 
would not apply to this case. As stated by this Court in Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation: 
"the test is whether the employer's conduct in the second role or capacity has generated 
obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from the company's or individual's first 
role as an employer. If the obligations are related, the doctrine is not applicable." 707 
P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1985). Whatever obligations UPS may have had with respect to 
preserving evidence at the site of the Hills' accident, those obligations related to UPS' 
role as employer. Utah's OSH Act requires employers to not remove or destroy evidence 
that might pertain to the cause of an accident. Utah Admin. Code R614-1-5.C.2. To the 
extent any duty existed, it was this regulatory duty imposed on UPS in its role as an 
employer.5 Indeed, plaintiffs recognize this in their complaint, stating that "[a]U 
Defendants, including Defendant United Parcel Service, were under a directive and 
obligation from Utah OSHA, the Utah Labor Commissioner, and applicable law to 
preserve the premises and material evidence and to protect it against harm, destruction, or 
other spoliation." Comp. ^  59 (Rec. 13). It was "[p]ursuant to those directives," 
5
 For this reason, plaintiffs' reliance on Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles v. 
Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1273 (1991), is misplaced. Besides relying on the 
doctrine of spoliation, which California has now rejected, the employer was the 
voluntary caretaker of evidence after the injury. The case discusses no ongoing 
statutory requirement to preserve evidence. UPS, on the other hand, was, according 
to the complaint, continually subject to the Utah OSH Act requirements. 
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according to the plaintiffs' complaint, that UPS committed "to the performance of an 
undertaking, to wit, the presei .*. ><<.. /,/ j^ 60 
(Kn i ' | . 
Plaintiffs' complaint also alleges; "At all times relevant herein, all acts and 
omissions set forth herein against Defendants giving M i in ihi , nrtinn were bv 
employees .ind ,>r agents of said Defendants and said employees and or agents were 
acting \. iihin the scope and i ourse of their employment and or agency u ///. ihp 
Defendants, \ -.>ni| .•*••• cannot allege 
' i - -. ^oiib and omissions" were done within the scope and course of employment 
and avoid workers' compensation. 
Willioul " il.ih'Hi In III , t.idik" <ii i wv in I M ili in in. niher jurisdiction, plaintiffs 
now broadly claim that "any citizen" has a duty to preserve evidence. PL. Br. 31. Even 
assuming this is correct, it would not serve as a ba>i> u-\ wi\ wking u\. 
doctrine here. Ihnyjuim e\|iln'ill\" staled lltal " |l |lie decisive test to determine if the dual 
capacity doctrine is invokable is not whether the second function or capacity of the 
employer is different and separate from, the first." 70 7 P.2d at 680 (en lphasis added) 
":• - • ar iiu m ^  that because tlie function 
of preserving evidence is different than that as acting as Hills' employer, the dm! 
capacity doctrine applies. . • i (admitting that Htnyham pirn ides a "Yo- - • • 
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argument" to their analysis). Instead, UPS's evidence preservation obligation flows from 
its role as employer, coming from the Utah OSH Act.6 
Plaintiffs' argument should also fail because there is no reason for this Court to 
adopt the dual capacity doctrine at all. That doctrine, as used in some other jurisdictions, 
provides that workers' compensation may not apply in circumstances when an employer 
is acting outside the employer-employee relationship. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 
898 (Utah 1993). This Court has stressed, however, that the "dual capacity doctrine 
directly conflicts with the exclusive remedy provision" in Utah's Workers' Compensation 
Act and the quid pro quo between employees and employers that allows a workers' 
compensation system to function. Id. at 899. "The essence of a workers' compensation 
system is that it is a mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights between an employer and 
employee whereby both parties give up and gain certain advantages." Bingham, 101 P.2d 
at 679. "[Ejmployees are able to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault or 
being subject to defenses such as the fellow servant rule and employers are protected 
from tort suits by employees." Hunsaker, 870 P.2d at 899. Adopting plaintiffs' theory 
would eviscerate the protections afforded to employers through the bargain in the 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
Plaintiffs' second argument is that workers' compensation does not apply because 
UPS engaged in intentional misconduct. Although an exception applies under the Act if 
6
 Plaintiffs' reliance on Worthen v. Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985) (PL 
Br. at 30-31), is unavailing because that case held that Utah did not recognize the dual 
capacity doctrine. 
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the employer "directed or intended" the injurious act, this exception does not apply to 
I'PS lirvtwv l 7i/// tfii L SM V M W X^4-^^ I Ml.ih IT/S); s*vr//s^/.//// r ^i/V 
Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah Ct. App. ; V59j Requiring employee to 
show that the employer had an "actual deliberate intent to injure" to invoke the 
exception);/ h >lfv. C i lex t on I < S I i n, \, 203 P 3< 1 9 6 2 , 9 6 9 ( 1 It; ih 2009) (c sxplaii ringtfo 
intent to injure standard). To the contrary, plaintiffs' complaint alleges that it was 
Skyline's injurious conduct. <)oi T T ^ ' s . that caused the accident and M; ; 1;. - • ; >e 
CompL • ^ ' ' - -•> n- -hgcnt , 
not that it caused deliberate harm. Id. Y\\ 29-31 (Roc. "; Now here does plaint*' K 
complaint assert that I IPS deliberately directed and intended such negligent conduct by 
eel 2v idence to covei i lp its own 
culpability in the Hills accident. L die absence of allegations of deliberate intent by 
I IPS to cause Mr. Ifills' death, plaintiffs must rely on woikeiV compensation a> : he 
sole i en led/y agaii isl I IPS 
riiis case bears a striking resemblance to Glotzbach v. Fro/nan. 854 N.F 2d 33" 
(Ind. 2006), in which the Supreme Court of Indiana granted a motion t< . -.-I i 
Inr '..puliation I IM id*Mnv Instil npmi workers"1' compensation exclusivity. In that case an 
employee accidentally died due to the explosion ol a la 5 •'' at 338. The evidence from 
the accident site luui ivcn iiiiown awa\ > me empK \... 1 ic decedent's estate 
. , , . - ! • ; oi the tank for wrongful death and claims against 
the decedent's employer for negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence. I J Th 
Supreme Cour* -M Indiana granted the motion to dismiss because '"a;; ;:p- \ 
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a workplace accident to which the [Workers' Compensation Act] applies has no claim 
against the employer for third-party spoliation of evidence." Id. at 339. "[T]he employee 
is entitled to workers' compensation, and permitting claims of spoliation by the employee 
would open the door to satellite litigation against the employer that the [Workers' 
Compensation Act] is designed to foreclose." Id. at 341. The Court should reach the 
same conclusion here. 
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED 
The district court denied plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages because "[t]here 
must be a viable cause of action attached to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim." Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 12 (Rec. 1235). Without a spoliation claim, there could be no damages. Plaintiffs 
do not dispute this argument, citing a Utah statute that recognizes that punitive damages 
may be assessed only when compensatory damages—due to a cause of action separate 
from punitive damages—has been established. See PL Br. 38 (citing Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-8-201(l)(a)). 
Instead, plaintiffs ask this Court not only to create what they acknowledge would 
be a new tort of spoliation in Utah, but to allow punitive damages to apply to the 
defendants as well should the plaintiffs prove the necessary elements of punitive 
damages. Should this Court decide to create a new tort of spoliation, it should not allow 
punitive damages in this case because doing so would raise issues of due process under 
the federal and State Constitutions. 
"While States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is 
well established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on 
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these awards. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of giossly excesMw 01 tnlntnu i puiiislmienl on ;> "orlfrjis"! Stat* ' •" » 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (20U3), reversing and remanding 65 
P.3d 1134 (cited in plaintiffs' brief at 38-39) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see 
also 1 Jtal I Const ai t I § / ('"" "I lo pei son si: ial.ll be depi b ' ed of lift libei ty oi pi op ei I:y, 
without due process of law."). u[E]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in oui 
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the 
C O ' ' i - •• - ' - - • • a 
State mav impose." State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 (internal quotation markb omui^d;. 
Constitutional ouc process requires that I rPS have notice of the applicability of punitive 
admission, should this Court rule in ib la\ or on the spoliation issue, it \\ oukl h, ihc first 
time that Utah has recognized that tort Therefore, it would ix fundamentally u-iiair to 
impose piniilM damages foi a ^polialmn loil in this casr because i IPS would lie 
punished for conduct that, at the time it occurred, was not subject to punitive damages. 
Landgrafv. USIFilm Prods., 51 M [ S 4 ;. . • , , , m^
 su. h an mi;, i n : to 
oc :i li conflicts s • itl i tl ic < li le pi ocess i igl its of I IPS ai id si ion ild be re jected. 
ys 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, UPS requests that the district court's orders be 
affirmed. 
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